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I INTRODUCTION
The decision by the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
to include general unfair contract terms control in their proposed new
consumer protection legislation is a step in the right direction.1 One
important gap in the draft legislation is the lack of a ‘grey list’ of suspect terms
which would usually be unfair, a mechanism widely used in unfair contract
terms legislation elsewhere.2 The decision to include a black list of
prohibited terms is an improvement over the Law Commission’s proposed
Bill of 1998 (which contained no black list).3 However, comparative
research suggests that its reach could have been extended somewhat. Many
of the clauses commonly found in black and grey lists elsewhere are not
mentioned in the draft South African legislation.
The Law Commission set out some lists in its comparative overview of the
use of ‘guidelines’ elsewhere in their 1998 Report, but never considered the
mechanism of black and grey lists in their evaluative comments. In the end,
they proposed twenty-six ‘factors’ which a court may take into account in
determining whether a contract or term is unreasonable, unconscionable or
oppressive under the general clause.4 These guidelines are mainly factors
relevant to a wide spectrum of terms, such as ‘the bargaining strength of the
parties relative to each other’. However, amongst these, one also ﬁnds nine
‘factors’ relating to speciﬁc types of terms, such as ‘whether prejudicial time
limits are imposed on the consumer’.5 The Law Commission never
considered whether it would be useful to rather include such terms in a grey
* BALLB LLD (Stellenbosch). I am grateful to the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law,
particularly its Director, Professor Stefan Vogenauer, for hosting me as a visiting fellow in Oxford where this
research was done. I also beneﬁted from ﬁnancial assistance by the National Research Foundation, the
Harry Crossley Fund and the International Ofﬁce of the University of Stellenbosch.
1 Draft Consumer Protection Bill, 2006, ﬁrst published for comment in General Notice 418 GG 28629
of 15 March 2006. See also Tjakie Naudé ‘Unfair contract terms legislation: the implications of why we
need it for its formulation and application’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch LR (forthcoming).
2 As will be shown below.
3 South African Law Commission Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of
Contracts (Project 47) (1998).
4 Section 2 of its proposed Bill.
5 Section 2(k).
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list as it is normally understood and used elsewhere, that is, a non-exhaustive,
indicative list of terms which are suspect or presumed to be unfair, but may
still be fair in the particular circumstances of the case. As a result, they did not
consider whether more than nine such terms should be greylisted or
blacklisted.
The widespread use of grey and black lists elsewhere and the tremendous
support for these mechanisms in international literature6 present a challenge
to the approach taken thus far in South Africa and demand a comprehensive
investigation of these mechanisms.7 Certain authors, writing before the
publication of the Law Commission’s Report, have supported the use of lists
of prohibited and suspect terms, but did not consider this mechanism in any
detail.8
Accordingly, in the ﬁrst part of this article, various general issues relevant
to such lists will be examined. First, the concept of black and grey lists will be
deﬁned, as the somewhat divergent use of terminology in international
practice actually identiﬁes three strategies for listing terms. Secondly, the
arguments in favour of and against the use of grey and black lists will be
considered. Thirdly, different views on the appropriate scope of lists will be
discussed, that is, whether they should also cover business-to-business
contracts and negotiated terms. Fourthly, consideration will be given to
views on how, if at all, a grey list should affect the burden of proof.
Thereafter some general principles for drafting lists will be set out. The last
part of the article will discuss fourteen categories of terms which are often
listed, and should receive the attention of the South African legislature. It is
to be hoped that it may also be helpful to legislatures of other countries
considering introduction or revision of lists.9
Whether or not the South African legislation ultimately includes a grey
list, it may be helpful for enforcement bodies and practitioners to know
which types of terms are commonly regarded as sufﬁciently problematic that
legislatures in many other systems have been prepared to single them out as
either prohibited or usually unfair.
It should be noted that the core of the substantive provisions of unfair
contract terms legislation normally consists of a general clause, which grants a
power to strike down clauses on the basis of an open standard such as fairness,
reasonableness or good faith, as well as a set of guidelines or factors to aid
in its application, and then a black and/or grey list. Obviously, when
adjudicating the fairness of a contested term, any black list will ﬁrst be
6 See notes 22ff below.
7 Naudé op cit note 1.
8 Peter Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 215–17; Gerhard Theodor
Siegfried Eiselen Die Beheer oor Standaardbedinge: ’n Regsvergelykende Ondersoek (unpublished LLD
dissertation, University of Potchefstroom, 1988) 434–5. See also Hein Kötz ‘Controlling unfair contract
terms: Options for legislative reform’ (1986) 103 SALJ 405 at 415.
9 Cf, for example, the suggestion by J W Carter & D J Harland Contract Law in Australia 4 ed (2002) 551,
namely that more certainty would be created if, following the European example, the existing lists of
relevant factors in the Australian state and federal legislation were to be supplemented by lists of types of
clauses which are to be absolutely or presumptively ineffective.
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considered, whereafter any grey list will be considered in the light of the
general clause and any guidelines for its application. Non-listed terms could
still be struck down under the general clause.
II TERMINOLOGY
A black list is a list of prohibited terms which are invalid under all
circumstances, whereas a grey list is a list of terms which may be unfair, but
the ﬁnal decision depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
However, closer examination reveals more than one strategy to draft a grey
list, which has caused some disparity in the use of terminology.
The German Civil Code (BGB) contains two lists. One is an extensive
black list.10 The introductory paragraph to the other list, called a ‘grey list’ by
German writers,11 also provides that the terms listed therein are ‘invalid’.12
The ﬁrst impression may therefore be that this is rather another black list. A
non-German writer has indeed called both lists ‘black’.13 The German ‘grey
list’ only contains items with a particular ‘open’ or ‘evaluative’ element in the
deﬁnition of the listed term itself, such as ‘an unreasonably long period’, ‘an
objectively justiﬁed reason’ or ‘a declaration . . . of particular importance’.14
These factors obviously take into account the particular circumstances of the
case, and its description as a ‘grey’ list therefore seems apt. However, once
the judicial evaluation in respect of the individual evaluative element brings a
term within the deﬁnition in the list, the term is ‘invalid’ and there is no need
or opportunity for recourse to other surrounding circumstances under the
general clause. The German grey list does not contain items without
evaluative elements in their deﬁnition.
Other grey lists, such as that of the EC Unfair Terms Directive,15 contain
both items with evaluative factors and items without. An example of the
latter type of item from the grey list of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)16 is
a term ‘which wholly or partially exempts the user of the standard term or a
third party of a legal duty to pay damages’. Similarly, the grey list of the
Model Law for Consumer Protection in Africa of 1996 refers to ‘any
provision imposing a burden of proof of any matter on the purchaser or user
of any goods or services, where the burden would otherwise lie on another
10 § 309 BGB.
11 Hans-W Micklitz ‘German Unfair Contracts Act and the EC Directive 93/13’ in Julian Lonbay (ed)
Enhancing the legal position of the European Consumer (1996) 173. See also James R Maxeiner ‘Standard-terms
contracting in the global electronic age: European alternatives’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 109
at 152.
12 § 308 BGB. The introductory phrase reads as follows: ‘In standard business terms, the following terms,
in particular, are invalid’ (translations throughout by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BGB.htm).
13 Ewoud Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden (1978) 613; idem Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1987) 183.
14 § 308(1), (3) and (6)(a) BGB.
15 EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (‘the Directive).
As a minimum-harmonization directive, it prescribes a minimum level of protection. See on the status of
the Directive’s list, art 3(3) and the Recital as well as Commission of the European Communities v Sweden Case
C-478/99; [2002] ECR I-4147 para 11.
16 Article 6:237(f ) BW (Dutch Civil Code) (my translation).
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party to the contract’.17 Unlike the German provision, this type of grey list
does not contain an introductory paragraph invalidating the listed terms, but
states that the terms therein ‘may be regarded as unfair’18 or are ‘presumed to
be unreasonably detrimental’,19 with the implication that, even if a clause
corresponds with the description of a term in the list, it may nevertheless be
fair in the particular case.20
There are therefore three useful techniques when formulating lists. One is
to list clauses prohibited outright with no evaluative factors (a black list in the
narrow sense). A second is to list clauses with no evaluative factors which are
suspect, but may be saved in appropriate circumstances (a grey list). A third
‘in-between’ technique is to list clauses with evaluative elements reminiscent
of the open standards of the general clause, the application of which ﬁnally
determines whether the clause is prohibited or not.
It probably does not make much practical difference whether the last type
of clause is stated to be prohibited, and set out in the same list as prohibited
clauses with no evaluative elements (such as in Austria’s black list), or set out
in a separate list of prohibited clauses (as in Germany), or included in a list of
suspect clauses that also contains clauses with no evaluative elements in their
deﬁnition (such as in the Dutch grey list, or that of the Directive or African
Model Law). If the grey list should include the latter type of clause, and I
think that it should, it would make more sense to include prohibited terms
with evaluative factors in the grey list, as they involve the particular
circumstances of the case.
III THE CASE FOR THE USE OF LISTS OF PROHIBITED AND
SUSPECT TERMS
Simply put, black and grey lists enhance the effectiveness of the control of
unfair contract terms and they lead to greater predictability.21 With good
reason they have been described by leading international writers as ‘of crucial
importance’22 and ‘the key element of any attempt to regulate unfair
terms’.23
Lists increase the chance of the legislation having a fast, real and proactive
effect. Self-imposed control is promoted, as businesses are more likely to
react spontaneously to unequivocal commands in a black list and to a list of
17 Consumer Protection for Africa – Report of the Africa Conference on Consumer Protection, Harare, Zimbabwe,
28 April–2 May 1996 United Nations document ST/ESA/254 (1997). The grey list is set out in the
Schedule to the Unfair Contract Terms Rules, an Annex to the Model Law. See s 4(3)(b) of these rules on
the status of the list.
18 Article 3(3) of the Directive.
19 Article 6:237 BW.
20 As conﬁrmed in the Sweden case supra note 15.
21 Some of the arguments in this rubric were already mentioned in the summary of the beneﬁts of lists
given by Naudé op cit note 1. The present article contains a more in-depth discussion of the entire topic;
and it also responds to counter-arguments.
22 Hondius Unfair Terms op cit note 13 at 183.
23 Giorgio de Nova ‘Italian Contract Law and the European Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 221 at 230.
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suspect terms, than to a general criterion of unfairness, which may take a long
time to work out in practice.24
The need for effective, proactive control that is not solely dependant on
judicial control is obvious in the light of the costs and risks of litigation,
particularly when compared to the small amounts in issue in consumer
contracts.25 In addition, many consumers may not even know of the
possibility of challenging terms, and, to protect them, a proactive control
paradigm is essential. Court judgments also have limited effect.26 They only
bind the parties thereto. They may not even come to the notice of other
businesses and drafters, particularly as cases involving individual consumers
may come before the lower courts, whose decisions are not reported. In any
event, judicial control always comes too late, after the abuse has already taken
place, often for years.27
Grey lists strengthen the hands of the bodies empowered to take
preventive action when negotiating with less conscientious businesses to stop
using unfair terms, decreasing the need for expensive and time-consuming
court action.28 For example, the United Kingdom’s Ofﬁce of Fair Trading
(OFT), whose success in eradicating unfair terms is widely admired,29 clearly
considers lists to be useful in their negotiation with businesses.30 Their
system of preventative control operates largely without recourse to the
courts. A threat of a grey list being used against a business in injunction
proceedings is more likely to spur it into negotiations with the administrative
watchdog or consumer organizations (to delete or adapt the contested clause)
than a mere reference to an open-ended general clause.31
In the absence of lists, it would take a long time for the courts to develop
any kind of predictability as to what is unfair.32 It is obvious that the increased
24 Geraint Howells ‘Good Faith in consumer contracting’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma J Hird &
Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 91 at 98; Karl-Heinz Neumayer
‘Contracting subject to standard terms and conditions’ in Arthur von Mehren (ed) International Encyclopedia
of Comparative Law vol VII ch 12 (1999) 96–97 (paras 12–96).
25 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 488; C F C van der Walt ‘Aangepaste voorstelle vir ’n
stelsel van voorkomende beheer oor kontrakteervryheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg’ (1993) 56 THRHR 65
at 75; Maxeiner op cit note 11 at 144.
26 Ibid.
27 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 488.
28 The SouthAfrican Law Commission correctly considered it essential for effective unfair terms control
that an administrative body be empowered to take action against businesses by seeking undertakings to
delete or amend unfair terms, failing which the administrative body may apply for a prohibitory interdict
(injunction).
29 See, for example, Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5
April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts COM (2000) 248 ﬁnal (hereafter, ‘Report from the
Commission’) at 24.
30 The OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (February 2001) demonstrates how the OFT has used the list
to negotiate undertakings with businesses. See also DTI Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate
(United Kingdom) European Commission Review of Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts: UK Response to the European Commission (2001) (hereafter ‘UK Response’) para 17.
31 The ﬂexibility of a grey list, as used in the UK, has often led to agreement between the OFT and
businesses to rewrite a particular listed term so that it does not go beyond the business’s justiﬁable interests
and is clear to consumers.
32 Aronstam op cit note 8 at 215–7; Eiselen op cit note 8 at 430; Kötz op cit note 8 at 415; Hugh Beale
‘Legislative control of fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in Jack Beatson &
Daniel Friedmann Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 231 at 246; Ewoud Hondius ‘The reception
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predictability at an early stage, which lists supply, beneﬁts everyone involved
— businesses, drafters of standard terms, consumers considering challenging
terms, bodies empowered to bring preventive proceedings, and courts.33
The more speciﬁc the rules, the easier it is for a business to know what is
required,34 and which risks it must bear or insure against or shift onto the
consumer in a fairer manner.35 Listing also increases the chance that
rewriting of standard terms would be a once-off expense, as a grey list gives
increased guidance to drafters as to the types of clauses that should be treated
with caution.36 If certain clauses are deemed so unfair in all situations to
warrant blacklisting, this at least assures businesses that all their competitors
are in exactly the same position.37
Judicial ofﬁcers may ﬁnd their task of reaching and motivating decisions
on unfairness easier where they have a suspect list to draw on.38
It is therefore not surprising that lists of prohibited and/or suspect terms
are found in many laws across the world, and that there is overwhelming
support for their use in the international literature.39 In 2001, after six years
of experience with the EC Directive’s grey list, the UK Government pointed
out that almost all respondents to their consultation paper on the
implementation of the Directive, from all sectors, said that the list is useful
and should be retained.40 The European Commission agreed in 2000 that the
list provides useful guidance to everyone involved.41 Comparative lawyers
of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts by member states’ (1995) 3 European Review of
Private Law 241 at 247; Maxeiner op cit note 11 at 153; Hugh Beale ‘Unfair terms in contracts: Proposals for
reform in the UK’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 289 at 304. Cf Carter & Harland op cit note 9 at 551.
33 Beale (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 289 op cit note 32 at 304.
34 Howells op cit note 24 at 98
35 Beale ‘Legislative control of fairness’ op cit note 32 at 246.
36 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 615; Hondius Unfair Terms op cit note 13 at 230.
37 Beale ‘Legislative control of fairness’ op cit note 32at 246.
38 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 615.
39 Most European countries have either a black list or a grey list, or both (see Report from the Commission
op cit note 29 at 17 for details). The grey list of the Model Law for Consumer Protection in Africa (op cit
note 17) replicates the list in the Zimbabwean Consumer ContractsAct 6 of 1994. Other countries with lists
include Brazil (Consumer Protection Code of 1990), Thailand (Unfair Contract Terms Act, BE 2540
(1997)) and Japan (Consumer Contract Act 129 of 2001). Certain clauses are prohibited in the Australian
Trade Practices Act of 1974, although grey lists have not been used there. See also, apart from the writers
cited in previous footnotes in this section, Susan Bright ‘Winning the battle against unfair contract terms’
(2000) 20 Legal Studies 331 at 349; Peter Dyer ‘Implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC in Sweden’ in
European Commission The ‘Unfair Terms’ Directive, Five years on: Evaluation and future perspectives, Brussels
Conference 1–3.7.1999 (1999) (hereafter ‘European Commission Brussels Conference’) 261 at 265; Nikos
Tzortzopoulos ‘Practical implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC in Greece’ in European Commission
Brussels Conference 281 at 285; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Report from the Commission
on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts’ OJ
2001/C 116/25 at C 116/121 (hereafter ‘EESC 2001 Opinion’). Various other European writers discuss the
lists of the Directive and their systems without speciﬁcally pointing out the advantages of this mechanism,
but they clearly accept the merits thereof. See, for example, Elizabeth MacDonald Exemption Clauses and
Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 249 ff.
40 UK Response op cit note 30 para 17. The respondents included representative business respondents,
such as the Confederation of British Industry, consumer groups, legal respondents, such as the General
Council of the Bar, academics and enforcement bodies, such as the OFT (see Annex 1 to the document).
41 Report from the Commission op cit note 29 paras 24–30.
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have also claimed that the lack of effectiveness of certain laws in practice had
been partly due to the absence of black and grey lists in those legal systems.42
The most common objection against a grey list is that it may undermine
the level of protection that would otherwise be available, as courts may
regard unlisted terms as unimpeachable.43 The Working Committee of the
South African Law Commission insisted on only a general clause with no
guidelines of any kind (and, by implication, no lists), because of the danger of
courts considering themselves bound exclusively by those guidelines.44
However, theWorking Committee did not discuss and evaluate comparative
experience with the use of guidelines and lists and was also opposed to any
system of abstract or preventive control, proposing only judicial control over
contracts with individual consumers.45 It gave no reasons for this stance,
which clearly ignores the inherent insufﬁciency of judicial control as the sole
control paradigm.
The Law Commission rejected the Working Committee’s proposal in
their ﬁnal Report and included a chapter on an Ombud with preventative
powers and twenty-six factors or guidelines, nine of which are reminiscent of
a grey list.46 Its justiﬁcation for guidelines was that
‘no preventative action is possible without guidelines and that informed self-control by drafters of
standard and model contracts, action by representative bodies, negotiations with a view to settling
disputes, etc, are all heavily dependant upon there being a large measure of predictability regarding the
question of what will be acceptable and what not in regard of contracts.’47
Indeed, any danger that judicial control will be compromised by the use of
lists, despite clear drafting to prevent that, is ‘balanced out’ by the more
serious danger that effective, proactive, self-imposed control, as well as
preventative control, which are not dependant on judicial control, would be
compromised if there are no lists.48 Speculation that grey lists would reduce
consumer protection in court proceedings could just as well be countered by
speculation that, in the absence of a grey list, there is a danger that
conservative judicial ofﬁcers would not vigorously use the open standard in a
general clause, without any further more direct indications as to when, at the
very least, they must have good reasons not to pronounce a clause unfair.
The concern that courts may limit their control to listed clauses simply
highlights the need to spell out in simple, clear language that the list is a
minimum or non-exhaustive list, so that other clauses not mentioned therein
42 Maxeiner op cit note 11at 122 in respect of the USA and Hondius Unfair Terms op cit note 13 at 178 in
respect of French and Danish law before implementation of the Directive. Cf also Hondius Unfair Terms op
cit note 13 at 207.
43 This argument is mentioned, but not supported, by Eiselen op cit note 8 at 431, in the Report from the
Commission op cit note 29 at 10, and by Neumayer op cit note 29 at 97.
44 Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts South African Law Commission
Working Paper 54 Project 47 (1994) at vii, 31–2.
45 Ibid, and at iv and 7. The Working Committee was prepared to invite comment on preventative
control by an administrative body, however (at 7).
46 Section 2.
47 Report op cit note 3 at vii, 168.
48 Cf ibid at 162 on guidelines.
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may also be unfair.49 An explanatory memorandum should preferably be
published with the legislation, in which the impossibility of enumerating all
the types of clauses that may be unfair in different types of contract is
emphasized.50
It is ironic that opponents of a grey list seem to imply that courts will not
possess the ability to determine that they are not bound exclusively by lists or
guidelines, despite clear wording to that effect, yet assume that courts have
the ability to apply the general clause in a manner sensitive to the
circumstances of each particular case.51
It is also signiﬁcant that the OFT has taken action against a number of
other commonly occurring terms that do not directly correspond to those in
the UK grey list.52 It is to be hoped that in South Africa the National
Consumer Commission and perhaps consumer organizations will be
similarly in the forefront of eradicating unfair terms, given that many
consumers lack the resources and knowledge to challenge unfair terms.
These bodies would, like the OFT, know full well that the grey list is
non-exhaustive and does not allow a contrario reasoning in respect of
unlisted clauses, and would vigorously put this view to a court. German
courts have also used the general clause to pronounce unlisted clauses unfair
in appropriate cases.53
The South African Working Committee’s very short Bill was also recently
supported by Jaco Barnard (without a comparative study of unfair terms
control and without reasons why only a judicial-control paradigm is
favoured).54 Barnard mentions the same objection as the Working Commit-
tee to guidelines,55 but in the main he seems to be critical of the mere idea of
any ‘rules’ or ‘categories’ in this context, which courts could use to hide
behind ‘a claim of neutrality’, as opposed to them making a reasoned value
judgment in the circumstances of each case.56 He states that legislation
should be ‘as open-ended as possible’ because
‘each time a court is faced by a question whether a contract should be enforced or not, it should be
guided in its interpretation and decision by the relational, the collective and the transformative as
opposed to a mechanical application of precedent. What is needed is real value judgments in stead of
49 See text at n 133 ff below.
50 Law Commissions in the UK also proposed that an explanatory memorandum be published with the
legislation which they propose should replace the Unfair Contract TermsAct 1977 and the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. See Law Commission for England and Wales & Scottish Law
Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act
1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005) (hereafter ‘English and Scottish Law
Commissions Report’).
51 Cf the criticism of the Working Committee’s objection by Liberty Life at 161 of the ﬁnal report op cit
note 3.
52 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (February 2001) Introduction and Parts III and IV. See also Hugh
Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts; Vol I: General Principles 29 ed (2004) 924–5; MacDonald op cit note 39 at
245–6.
53 BGHZ 82, 21 is an example.
54 Alfred Jacobus Barnard A Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African Law of Contract
(unpublished LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria 2006) 241.
55 Ibid at 204.
56 Ibid at 240–1.
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claims of neutrality. It is because of this concern with particularity that I believe that legislation in this
context should be as open-ended as possible.’57
However, he focuses only on the insufﬁcient paradigm of judicial
control,58 and, in addition, it must be said that the use of non-exhaustive
guidelines and a grey list by a court cannot be equated with the ‘mechanical
application of precedent’ and does not preclude a decision guided by ‘the
relational, the collective and the transformative’ at all. A properly drafted
non-exhaustive grey list by deﬁnition makes it clear that a decision as to
whether a clause is unfair involves a value judgment in regard to fairness in
the particular circumstances of the case, always taking into account the
overriding general clause, which typically refers to open standards such as
reasonableness and good faith. However, when a clause does fall within a
grey or black list, there is a greater chance that a business would cease to rely
on it or remove it voluntarily.
Barnard seems to be inﬂuenced by the view that ‘in the law of contract
individualism links up with a preference for the rule form and altruism with a
preference for the law in the form of standards,’59 which apparently leads him
to be suspicious of anything other than ‘open standards’ in the context of
contractual fairness. It is interesting to note that Stewart Macaulay, another
writer who warns against formalism’s predilection for rules, and who also
generally favours open standards to facilitate context-sensitive value judg-
ments, has recognized that a principled stand in favour of open standards only
is problematic.60 He states that
‘it is also true that in some situations more formality and relatively clear default rules may be justiﬁed. . . .
Perhaps paradoxically another area [where this is the case] might be consumer transactions where one
side almost certainly will not be represented by lawyers [in concluding contracts]. Clear rules here might
cut the costs of consumers seeking remedies; consumers can seldom afford to battle about reasonableness
and unconscionability when the product in issue cost only a few thousand dollars.’61
In contrast to Barnard’s criticism is the criticism of grey lists by the
‘European Consumer Law Group’, before ﬁnalization of the Directive,
namely that such lists ‘may be interpreted too individualistically and
procedure-oriented,’ which leads them to favour absolute prohibitions in a
black list only.62 This is not a convincing reason to jettison the grey-list
technique as a supplement to a black list. As long as judges are aware of the
possibility of striking out terms on the basis of generalized substantive
unfairness in appropriate cases, they should be allowed to also have recourse
to the facts of an individual case, including the manner or ‘procedure’ in
which the contract was concluded.63 The advantage of a grey list is that it can
57 Ibid.
58 He does not address the Law Commission’s argument that judicial control is not sufﬁcient in the
consumer context, and that preventative control beneﬁts from the use of guidelines.
59 Op cit note 54 at 211.
60 ‘The real and the paper deal: Empirical pictures of relationships, complexity and the rrge for
transparent simple rules’ (2003) 66 Modern LR 44.
61 Ibid at 64.
62 European Consumer Law Group ‘Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts’ (1991) 14 Journal of Consumer Policy 107 at 114.
63 See Naudé op cit note 1.
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include more terms than a black list, increasing the chance of self-imposed
control in a wider range of clauses and strengthening the hands of
administrative bodies or consumer organizations engaging in negotiations
over clauses not covered by the black list. A country with practically no
experience of the general control of unfair contract terms (like South Africa)
would probably tread carefully when drawing up a black list, and may not
feel ready to draw up the kind of extensive black lists found in some
European countries. Where there is any doubt as to whether a clause which
seems substantively unfair may be justiﬁable in special circumstances, such an
inexperienced country may do well by greylisting the term. Experience can
then conﬁrm whether it should be blacklisted, whilst in the meantime such a
country garners the advantages for self-control and preventative control of a
grey list.
Nordic governments, too, opposed inclusion of the Directive’s indicative
or grey list in the text of their legislation,64 but the Directive’s grey list was
added to the preparatory materials of the legislation, which play an important
role in Nordic statutory interpretation.65 In Sweden the Market Court refers
to the list and the Swedish Consumer Agency uses it as a starting point in its
negotiations with businesses and organizations.66 This is reported by a
Swedish practitioner, Peter Dyer, without any criticism being raised of
reduced consumer protection.67 Moreover, Ulf Bernitz, a prominent
Swedish expert on the control of unfair contract terms, pleads for inclusion
of a grey list in the legislation itself.68 Another reason for the Nordic
governments’ opposition to inclusion of the grey list in the legislative text
itself was the possibility of confusion, as certain terms were already
‘outlawed’ in their domestic legal orders.69 However, clear drafting could
indicate that terms which are prohibited outright according to other sources
of law remain prohibited, or such terms could be blacklisted.
Lastly, the question arises whether it is better to grey-list clauses, rather
than merely to refer to such clauses in a list of ‘factors’ (each time preceded by
‘whether’) as was done by the South African Law Commission and the
Victoria Fair Trading Act 16 of 1999 (Australia).70 Greylisting is more
appropriate because it emphasizes that the listed terms are under substantial
suspicion. The effect of placing such clauses in a list of ‘factors’ is not clear
enough. A practical consideration is that a list of general guidelines or factors
is also useful,71 and to include all types of terms which are suspect as factors in
such a list as well would make it too unwieldy.
64 Sweden case supra note 15 supra; Report from the Commission op cit note 29 at 10.
65 Dyer op cit note 39 at 264.
66 Dyer op cit note 39 at 265.
67 Ibid.
68 European Law in Sweden – Its Implementation and Role in Market and Consumer Law (2002) 234.
69 Report from the Commission op cit note 29 at 16.
70 Section 32X.
71 See, for example, s 14(4) of the Draft Unfair Contract Terms Bill in the English and Scottish Law
Commissions’Report op cit note 50 at 135 (hereafter referred to as ‘UK Bill’).
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IV SPHERE OF APPLICATION
The proposed South African consumer protection legislation deﬁnes
‘consumers’ widely to include small businesses72 and all non-juristic persons,
including where they act for purposes related to their business.73 The
unfair-terms portion of the legislation also applies without differentiation to
negotiated and non-negotiated terms.
The extent to which unfair contract terms legislation should allow review
of business-to-business (B2B) contracts and negotiated terms is a controver-
sial and complex question, which cannot be addressed in this article.
Nevertheless, I will consider views on the desirability of restricting lists to
business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts and non-negotiated terms, even
when a legal system decides to allow review of (some) B2B contracts and/or
negotiated terms as well.74 But ﬁrst ﬁve different ways in which legal systems
have responded to this issue will be set out.
Five different approaches in international practice
First, the same list or lists could apply to B2C and B2B contracts and to
non-negotiated and negotiated terms, without differentiation in the text of
the legislation itself. The black list of the proposed South African legislation
applies without differentiation to all types of terms and to the B2B contracts
covered by the Bill.
Secondly, some countries’ lists apply to B2C contracts only, with B2B
contracts being subject to the general clause. This is the case in Germany and
the Netherlands, and it is also consistent with the approach of the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL).75 The PECL’s unfair-terms provision is
aimed at B2B contracts and private contracts, given that the Unfair Terms
Directive already provides for mandatory minimum consumer protection.76
The PECL includes no black or grey list, but only a general clause plus
guidelines for its application.77 The Ofﬁcial Commentary notes that ‘listing
terms as being per se unfair in contracts between professionals are generally
held to be all but impossible because of the diversity of commercial
contracts.’78 It adds that courts may still ﬁnd the Directive’s list useful,
particularly in respect of commercial contracts between small and large
72 Deﬁned with reference to turnover and asset value.
73 This was the position in the published version of the draft legislation. There are subsequent indications
that the DTI intends to narrow the deﬁnition of ‘consumer’ in the version of the draft legislation that they
intend to introduce into parliament, in which case all B2B contracts with small businesses will not be
regulated (e-mail from Ms Magauta Mpahlele of the DTI to the author of 22 September 2006).
74 For the purposes of this discussion, ‘consumers’ are persons who enter into contracts wholly or mainly
for purposes unrelated to their business or profession. A ‘non-negotiated term’ refers to a term drafted in
advance, where the consumer has not been able to inﬂuence the substance of the term, particularly in the
context of a pre-formulated standard contract. It therefore includes a term pre-formulated for a speciﬁc
contract.
75 Ole Lando & Hugh Beale (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: Parts I and II (2000).
76 Ibid at 266.
77 Article 4:110.
78 Op cit note 75 at 266.
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businesses.79 As in Germany and the Netherlands, the PECL provides only
for review of non-negotiated terms in this article.
A third technique is to stipulate separate lists for B2B and B2C contracts.
Portugal has a black and grey list for all types of standard terms (that is,
including in B2B contracts),80 with additional lists which only apply to B2C
contracts.81
Fourthly, Austria’s consumer protection law has a black list which applies
to both negotiated and non-negotiated terms,82 plus an additional black list
which applies to non-negotiated terms only.83
The proposed Unfair Contract Terms Bill of the English and Scottish Law
Commissions is illustrative of a ﬁfth, more complex, approach.84 The Bill
prohibits different terms in respect of consumer contracts, small-business
contracts85 and other B2B contracts, with some overlap. These prohibitions
are set out in the different sections dealing with each of these types of
contracts. The grey list in Schedule 2 applies to negotiated and non-
negotiated terms in B2C contracts,86 but only to ‘standard terms’ in respect of
small-business contracts. No grey list is proposed for other B2B contracts.87
B2B contracts
There are compelling reasons for restricting lists of terms to B2C contracts,
even when unfair terms legislation covers B2B contracts as well. Alterna-
tively, the B2C lists, or a different set of lists, could be extended to
non-negotiated terms in business-to-small business contracts.
The diversity of commercial transactions requires more ﬂexible treatment
than B2C contracts.88 In the latter context, the balance of inexperience,
sophistication, commercial dependence, and bargaining strength is more
uniform than in B2B contracts. Some clauses, particularly suitable in
commercial transactions, are likely to be unfair in the consumer context,
such as mandatory arbitration clauses,89 and should only be listed in the B2C
context. B2C lists tend to have a reﬂective effect on B2B contracts anyway,
79 Ibid at 268.
80 Articles 18 and 19 of Decree-Law No 446/85 of 25 October 1985 on unfair contract terms, as
amended by Decree-Law No 220/95 of 31 January 1995.
81 Articles 21 and 22. See also the EESC 2001 Opinion op cit note 39 at C 116/125 which supports this
approach.
82 § 6(1) Konsumentenschutzgesetz (some items with evaluative elements such as those in the German
‘grey’ list).
83 § 6(2).
84 Op cit note 50.
85 Deﬁned in terms of number of employees.
86 That is, contracts by natural persons acting outside the scope of their business or profession.
87 Which is only subjected to limited control. The current position in the UK is that the grey list in the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (‘UTCCR’, which largely replicates the Directive)
applies to non-negotiated terms in consumer contracts, whereas the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977
(‘UCTA’) prohibits certain clauses in B2C and B2B contracts and subjects certain other types of clauses to a
reasonableness standard.
88 PECL Ofﬁcial Commentary op cit note 75 at 266; Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz Introduction to
Comparative Law 3 ed (translated by Tony Weir) (1998) 344; Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at
619.
89 See note 236 below.
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particularly in favour of unsophisticated, small businesses, so that it is not
imperative for lists to apply to B2B contracts as well. This is the experience in
Germany and the Netherlands, where courts have often found terms listed
for B2C contracts to be unfair in B2B contracts under the general clause.90
Negotiated terms
An advantage of restricting lists to non-negotiated terms is that the lists could
be considerably extended.91 A number of terms that would be unobjection-
able if negotiated are suspect when imposed through standard terms.92
The Austrian model of one list for all terms and an additional one for
non-negotiated terms should also be considered. As noted before, a grey list
could be useful in respect of small business contracts, but then it should only
apply to non-negotiated terms.
V THE EFFECT OF A GREY LIST ON THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The Law Commissions in the UK stated quite rightly that the question how
greylisting should affect the burden of proof is a difﬁcult one.93 The
European legislative provisions and literature on this topic reveal three
approaches.
First, the burden of proof could depend on whether a clause is listed.
Greylisted clauses could be declared presumptively invalid, whereas the
burden of proof rests on the party challenging unlisted terms.
A second approach is for the legislation to be silent on the question of the
burden of proof. Some hold that there can be no question of a burden of
proof in this context, as the unfairness of a term is a question of law for
neutral assessment by the court.
The third approach is to provide explicitly for the burden of proof to
remain on one party, regardless of whether a clause is listed.
These three approaches will be considered in turn, after which a
recommendation will be made.
Onus-reversal approach
The Dutch Civil Code takes the approach that greylisted clauses are
presumptively unfair.94 This reverses the normal burden of proof, which
would ordinarily have fallen on the person alleging unfairness.
This approach has the advantage of a clear status being accorded to the
grey list. By contrast, the silence of the Directive on the burden of proof may
90 Maxeiner op cit note 11 at 153; Danny Busch; Ewoud H Hondius & Hugo J van Kooten, et al (eds)
The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law (2002) 216.
91 Hondius op cit note 32 at 244.
92 Todd D Rakoff ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An essay in reconstruction’ (1983) 96 Harvard LR 1173 at
1266.
93 Law Commission for England and Wales & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Contract Terms – a Joint
Consultation Paper (Law Com Consultation Paper No 166, Scot Law Com Discussion Paper No 119)
(hereafter ‘English and Scottish Law Commissions Consultation Paper’) 110.
94 Article 6:237 BW.
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lead to conﬂicting views on this issue.95 Placing the onus on the consumer in
respect of unlisted clauses is also said to give at least some beneﬁt to traders
who followed the guidance of the list.96
On the other hand, to do so may increase any supposed danger that courts
would too easily assume that non-listed terms are fair, whereas it is simply
impossible to draft a comprehensive list which covers all conceivable
contract types and situations. The Law Commissions in the UK also take the
view that the imposition of any onus on a consumer would be too great a
burden.97
No question of a burden of proof
At a 1999 conference on the Directive’s implementation, the Health and
Consumer Protection Director-General suggested that one cannot really
speak of a burden of proof in this context, as the unfairness of a term is a
question of law rather than of fact.98 On this view, greylisting is merely one
indication of unfairness, which courts must consider together with all other
relevant circumstances. Simon Whittaker, author of the relevant chapter in
Chitty on Contract argues that the European Court of Justice would probably
conclude that ‘the issue of fairness is not itself an issue proper for the
imposition of a burden of proof, but rather for a neutral judicial
assessment’.99 This is said to be the implication of its decision in Oceano
Grupo Editorial SA v Murciano Quintero100 that a national court is entitled to
raise the issue of unfairness of its own initiative. Whittaker ﬁnds the decision
incompatible with a simple imposition of a burden of proof: there is no need
for the consumer to claim or establish unfairness.101 However, thereafter he
distinguishes two situations: one is where the court raises the matter of its
own initiative and is able to decide the question of unfairness on the facts
already before the court. The other is where additional facts are needed for
the court to reach a decision, in which case a burden of proving these facts
becomes relevant. It therefore appears that he does accept that it would be
useful to allocate a burden of proving facts from which the court can assess
the unfairness of a clause for this type of situation.
That ‘unfairness’ is a question of law does not preclude imposition of a
presumption of unfairness of listed terms as a matter of logic. This could be
described as a ‘presumption of law’, the rebuttal of which would involve
95 Cf Zealander & Zealander v Laing Homes Ltd [1999] CILL 1510 (list merely contains guidelines and
creates no presumptions) and Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2000] 1 All ER 240 at
254.
96 English and Scottish Law Commissions Consultation Paper op cit note 94 at 110.
97 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 11.
98 As reported by Vincenzo Roppo ‘Workshop 3: The deﬁnition of ‘‘unfairness’’: the application of
Article 3(1), 4(1) – and of the annexes of the directive’ in European Commission Brussels Conference (op cit
note 39) 125 at 128.
99 Beale op cit note 52 at 912–3 para 15–065. See also Simon Whittaker ‘Judicial interventionism and
consumer contracts’ (2001) 117 LQR 215–8.
100 [2000] ECR I-4941.
101 Beale op cit note 52 at 912, para 15–064.
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proof of, and argument on, the facts of the case. In addition, even though the
legislation should explicitly allow a court to raise the issue of unfairness of its
own accord, a clear provision in respect of the burden of proof remains
useful to allocate the risk of non-persuasion if the state of the evidence
precludes a clear conclusion.102 Although it would strictly speaking be more
correct to speak of a burden of proving facts from which the court may assess
the question of unfairness, it is probably convenient shorthand to speak of a
burden of proving unfairness or fairness, provided that it is clear that a court
may raise the issue of unfairness of its own initiative. The English and
Scottish Law Commissions’ Bill speciﬁcally provides that a court may raise
the issue of unfairness on its own initiative,103 but also provides for the
imposition of a burden of proof once the issue of unfairness is raised.104 If
nothing is said on the burden of proof in the belief that none can be
involved, the courts could still reach conﬂicting conclusions on whether and
how the burden of proof remains relevant.105
Provision for an unchanging burden of proof
The third approach accepts that a position should be taken on the burden of
proof, but that this should not vary according to whether a term is listed, the
list being merely a persuasive factor which throws substantial suspicion on
the terms therein. Thus, the French legislation implementing the Directive
apparently places the burden of proof on the consumer, whether or not a
term is listed.106 The English and Scottish Law Commissions propose a more
complex approach: in cases involving individual consumers, the burden of
proof should be on the business once the issue of unfairness is raised,
regardless of whether the term in question is greylisted.107 On the other
hand, the OFT or other regulatory body should carry the burden of proof in
preventive injunction proceedings,108 as should a small business that
challenges a term.109
A justiﬁcation for the burden to remain on the business is that it is the party
seeking an advantage by deviating from existing residual rules (non-
mandatory law). As these rules typically represent a fair balancing of interests,
it is fair to require the business to justify departure from them,110 especially as
the non-negotiated terms of a consumer contract can often not be regarded
as the result of the self-determination or autonomy of the consumer.111 This
102 In South Africa the burden of proof is sometimes equated with ‘the risk of non-persuasion’ (e g P-J
Schwikkard & Steph E van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) 537).
103 Section 21, op cit note 71.
104 Section 16(1).
105 Cf note 96 above.
106 Beale op cit note 52 at 911, citing loi no 95–96 of 1 February 1995, Art 1, newArt L 132–1, al 3 Code
de la consomation.
107 Section 16(1). In the UK individual consumers cannot bring abstract proceedings for an injunction.
The situation envisaged here is where a contract with an individual consumer is considered by a court.
108 Section 16(2).
109 Section 17(2).
110 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 48.
111 Naudé op cit note 1.
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argument cannot apply to the core terms (as to price and subject-matter)
whereas the proposed South African legislation speciﬁcally gives consumers
the right to buy at a fair price. Hopefully intervention would be limited to a
manifestly unjust price at the most.112 If the legislature continues on this
path, there should be an explicit provision that the burden of proving the
price to be (manifestly) unjust is on the consumer. It seems fair that in
abstract, preventive proceedings the burden of proving unlisted terms unfair
should rest on the party challenging the term, certainly in respect of unlisted
terms, as they have more resources than consumers and the opposite rule
would be ‘unduly restrictive for businesses’.113 The English and Scottish Law
Commissions’ justiﬁcation for the burden being placed on a small business
challenging a term is that they require less protection than consumers.114
The disadvantage of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ approach
is its complexity, but this in itself should not be decisive, as the different
contexts may well justify differentiated treatment.
Evaluation
Certainly, an explicit provision on the burden of proof or a presumption of
unfairness is helpful as an allocation of the risk of non-persuasion. The policy
arguments in favour of the different ways in which this could be done are
rather evenly balanced (although the French solution of the burden always
remaining on the consumer should be rejected).
As long as it is clear that unlisted clauses may also be unfair, and that the
court has the power to intervene mero motu, a presumption of invalidity in
respect of greylisted clauses but not in respect of unlisted clauses, does not
create a danger of courts unduly regarding unlisted clauses as unimpeachable.
On balance, however, the English and Scottish Law Commissions’
solution of always placing the burden on the business when an individual
consumer is involved and the issue is raised appears to be the best for that
context. This eliminates any danger of too much weight being placed on the
absence of a term from the list. However, in proceedings which do not
involve an individual consumer, that is, in preventive, abstract interdict
proceedings and where a small business is involved, the listed clauses should
be presumptively unfair, whereas the burden of proving unlisted clauses
should be on the party challenging the term. The administrative body or
consumer organizations or small businesses challenging unlisted terms
require less protection than individual consumers. Yet the ‘substantial
suspicion’which the grey list raises against its contents might as well translate
into a presumption of invalidity. The legislation should therefore provide
that listed clauses are presumed to be unfair, but that, in cases involving
individual consumers, the burden of proving a clause to be fair is always on
112 How exactly this should be done is beyond the scope of this contribution, no research having been
conducted on this aspect.
113 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 55.
114 Ibid at 135.
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the business once the issue is raised by the consumer or by the court of its
own initiative.
VI GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE DRAFTING OF THE
LISTS
Some of the literature on lists offers broad general principles to guide their
drafting. These principles relate to issues such as prerequisites for inclusion
and mechanisms for regular updating.
Prerequisites for inclusion and length of lists
The contents of black and grey lists would obviously vary from country to
country, depending on variables such as other legislation and common-law
rules which already impose mandatory implied terms, or outlaw certain
clauses, or prescribe detailed rules in regard to the treatment of certain
clauses.115 It is too difﬁcult — and unnecessary — for the lists to reﬂect all
these rules.116 To include all common-law rules might also hinder the
development of those rules through judicial guidance.117
To keep them manageable, lists should focus on terms which are not
desirable across different types of contracts. Mandatory rules unique to
speciﬁc types of contracts should rather be dealt with in sector-speciﬁc
legislation, or, in the relevant parts of any consumer-protection legislation.118
The unfair-terms legislation should state that it is additional to, and not
intended to replace, other statutory and common-law measures of con-
trol.119
Peculiar trade practices may also justify blacklisting of clauses which are
irrelevant in other countries. For example, the South African Bill blacklists
clauses which authorize the supplier of services to take control of the
consumer’s bank card and personal identiﬁcation number and to withdraw
money from his account when payments are overdue.120 This type of
agreement is probably unimaginable in Europe.
A term should obviously only be blacklisted if a clear case can be made out
that it will always be unfair for violating generally accepted principles in all
115 For example, the SouthAfrican common law rules against exclusion of liability for fraud or intentional
harm and against exclusion of the seller’s liability to repay the price upon eviction, the mandatory implied
terms to protect tenants under the Rental HousingAct 50 of 1999 and the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of
1962, which grants courts discretionary power to control penalty clauses.
116 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 23–4.
117 Cf Ibid at 24.
118 However, it has also been suggested that separate lists could be drafted which would only apply to a
particular type of contract. Cf UK Response op cit note 30 at para 17. In my view, this could be done by the
enforcement body in a non-binding guidance after experience with enforcement in different sectors. See,
for example, the OFT Guidance on package holiday contracts available on their website.
119 Another technique is to include dragnet clauses in the black list itself. See, for example, ss 2(a) and (b)
of the proposed South African consumer protection legislation, listing, for example, a clause which directly
or indirectly purports to waive or deprive a consumer of a right set out in the Act.
120 Section 57(2)(j).
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conceivable circumstances.121 Countries such as Germany, Portugal and the
Netherlands have extensive black lists. On the other hand, the English and
Scottish Law Commissions propose only the blacklisting of exclusion or
limitation of liability for bodily injury or death caused by negligence, and of
certain mandatory implied terms in sale or supply of goods contracts.122 As
pointed out before, a country new to statutory unfair terms control, with no
prior history of virulent common-law intervention and whose socio-
economic circumstances are different to European countries, may legiti-
mately be wary of blacklisting too many clauses immediately.
A grey list, on the other hand, should preferably be as comprehensive as
possible.123 It is more useful to guide businesses and consumers than a set of
guidelines,124 and a comprehensive list decreases the supposed danger of
courts unjustiﬁably regarding unlisted clauses as unimpeachable.
It is probably advisable to ‘strike a balance between the amount of detail
given in respect of each type of term and the need to keep the list as
comprehensive as possible but of manageable proportions.’125 One tech-
nique to achieve this, while ensuring that businesses are adequately put on
notice, is to word some items rather generally to encompass different types of
terms, but to refer to particular sub-types in a list of examples to each term
published in an explanatory memorandum to the legislation. The English
and Scottish Law Commissions used this technique in their proposed Unfair
Contract Terms Bill. For example, they list ‘a term excluding or restricting
liability to A for breach of contract’ which may at ﬁrst sight only bring terms
worded closely to this formulation to mind. However, the list of examples in
the explanatory memorandum emphasize that other terms which indirectly
have this effect are also covered. Such examples include ‘a term which
requires claims to be made within a short period of time’ and ‘a term in a
contract for the repair of goods which provides that an ineffective repair will
be corrected only if a person returns the goods to a particular place at his own
expense’. By contrast, many legal systems with longer lists chose to include
these types of terms in the list itself, and this, in my view, is the best
approach.126 If a legislature decides instead that a short grey list is desirable, it
should certainly use the explanatory memorandum as suggested. The more
direct a command to businesses in respect of a particular term, the more
likely they are to remove it voluntarily.
121 English and Scottish Law Commissions Consultation Paper op cit note 94 at 14; European Commission
Communication on unfair terms in contracts concluded by consumers presented to Council on 14 Feb 1984 (1984) EC
Bull, Suppl 1/84, based on COM (84) 55 ﬁnal, 14; EESC 2001 Opinion op cit note 39 at C 116/121.
122 The decision to provide for the latter expressly is based on the UK’s duty to implement the EC Sale of
Consumer Goods andAssociated Guarantees Directive 99/44/EC (English and Scottish Law Commissions
Report op cit note 50 at 23–4).
123 Beale ‘Legislative control of unfairness’ op cit note 32 at 246.
124 Ibid.
125 UK DTI Consumer & Competition Policy Directorate Commission Review of Council Directive
93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Consultation Paper)(2000) (hereafter ‘UK DTI
Consultation Paper’) para 4.8. Cf EESC 2001 Opinion op cit note 39 at 121.
126 See Part VII below.
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To give an idea of the length of lists in some other countries, the German
‘grey’ list of prohibited terms with an evaluative element has eight
paragraphs, and the black list thirteen, but if the sub-types blacklisted in
sub-paragraphs are counted as well, about twenty-four (thus a total of
thirty-one listed terms). The Dutch Civil Code’s grey and black lists contain
fourteen items each. In the Portuguese legislation, eleven terms are
blacklisted in respect of any standard term contract, and a further six in
respect of consumer contracts. The grey list of terms with an evaluative
element, which applies to all standard term contracts, has ten items, and the
one applicable to consumer contracts only, eleven (thus a total of thirty-eight
listed terms). The Directive’s grey list with seventeen paragraphs is shorter,
but additional sub-types of terms are sometimes speciﬁcally mentioned as
well.127
Provision for regular updatement
As it would be impossible to list exhaustively all clauses which could be
suspect, and in view of the constant ingenuity of drafters, the lists should be
regularly revised.128 The English and Scottish Law Commissions propose to
empower the Secretary of State to add to or amend the list.129 However, I
agree with Ewoud Hondius that such a delegated power raises questions of
legitimacy.130 Instead, the legislation should provide that the administrative
enforcement body should regularly review the black and grey lists and
recommend amendments by Parliament. In the meantime, the administra-
tive enforcement body should report case law and experience with
extra-judicial enforcement on a broad front to increase the effectiveness of
the legislation.131
Wording
It is important to use simple, clear language in order that consumer advisers
and business people who are not lawyers are able to understand the
legislation.132 It is especially important that the status of the lists be spelt out
in simple, unambiguous language to prevent any possible impression that
unlisted clauses are generally above suspicion. A description of the grey list as
‘non-exhaustive and indicative only’ is convenient shorthand, but experi-
ence shows that this terminology (used in the Directive) may be confusing
on its own.133 The following wording could be considered in this regard:
127 Hugh Beale would have liked to see a fuller grey list than merely that of the Directive in the UK
legislation (‘Legislative control of fairness’ op cit note 32 at 246).
128 Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 615; European Consumer Law Group op cit note 62 at
111; Beale ‘Legislative control of unfairness’ op cit note 32 at 256; EESC 2001 Opinion op cit note 39 at 121;
English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 45; UK Response op cit note 30 at para
A2(ii).
129 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 45.
130 Standaardvoorwaarden op cit note 13 at 617.
131 As the OFT does. See also Naudé op cit note 1.
132 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 50 at 3–5, 19–21.
133 Cf Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson EC Consumer Law (1997) 105.
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‘Non-exhaustive and indicative list of terms that may be unfair
(1) A term is presumed to be unfair if it has the object or effect of a term: (a) excluding. . .(b). . .
(2) The list in [subsection/paragraph] (1) above is not exhaustive so that other terms may also be unfair.
(3) The list is indicative only so that a term covered by the list may be fair in view of the particular
circumstances of the case.’
The ﬁrst sentence, which refers to the ‘object or effect’ of a term serves to
prevent arguments that only terms which are worded in exactly the same
way are covered.134
Experience with the Directive led the European Commission to state that
vague wording of a listed item, which may result in it relating to a large
number of very different contractual terms, leading to disputes, weakens the
practical impact and usefulness of the list.135 They identiﬁed clause 1(b) of
the Directive’s list (exclusion or limitation of liability for breach) in this
regard, noting that a third of cases contained in the CLAB database by 2000
concerned this item.136 The English and Scottish Law Commissions decided
thereafter to retain clause 1(b) in their grey list, but added some sub-types in
the list of examples.137 The fairness of exemption clauses for breach is very
much dependant on the individual facts of a case, and disputes are probably
unavoidable.138 Nevertheless, listing such clauses could be justiﬁed because
many will be unfair; and at least the list serves to put businesses on notice that
they should carefully consider whether their particular circumstances justify
an exemption or limitation of liability. This remains a useful function of the
list.
VII TERMS GENERALLY INCLUDED IN LISTS
Fourteen major categories of terms often encountered in black and grey lists
are identiﬁed and discussed under this rubric.
One function of grouping categories of terms together in the manner
attempted here is that such systematic ordering of the listed clauses may help
to make black and grey lists more manageable.139
The discussion draws on the lists of the Directive (replicated in the UK
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999), and of the relevant
legislation in Germany,140 Austria,141 the Netherlands,142 Portugal,143
134 MacDonald op cit note 39 at 250; Beale op cit note 52 at 917. This wording is used in the Directive.
135 Report from the Commission op cit note 29 at 16.
136 Ibid. The CLAB database is a free online database of cases decided under the Unfair Terms Directive.
137 Schedule 2 para 2.
138 If consumer protection legislation should grant consumers (mandatory) guarantees of quality in respect
of goods, as the DTI proposes, this class of term would lose some signiﬁcance. Cf Maxeiner op cit note 11 at
135.
139 Cf UK Response op cit note 30 at para 18; European Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the
proposal for a Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1991) OJ 91/C 159/13 at C 159/37.
140 §§ 308 and 309 BGB.
141 § 6 Konsumentenschutzgesetz.
142 Articles 6:236 and 6:237 BW.
143 Articles 18, 19, 21 and 22 of Decree-Law No 446/85 of 25 October 1985 on unfair contract terms, as
amended by Decree-Law No 220/95 of 31 January 1995.
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Brazil,144 Japan,145 Thailand146 and the Model Law for Consumer Protection
in Africa.147 It also refers to the black list of the proposed South African
consumer protection legislation and the grey list of the English and Scottish
Law Commissions’ Unfair Contract Terms Bill of 2005.148 The South
African Law Commission’s investigation team’s list of problematic clauses
which ‘should receive the critical attention of the legislature’ is also taken
into account, as are some of the ‘factors’ in the South African Law
Commission’s proposed Bill of 1998, which are reminiscent of a list. The
same applies to the list of ‘factors’ of the Victoria Fair TradingAct 16 of 1999.
Also referred to is the list of twenty-eight terms formulated by the Council of
Europe in 1976, ‘which are considered in the majority of member States to
be unfair to consumers’.149
It should be noted that sector-speciﬁc terms, such as those relating to
remedies for non-conforming goods, are not mentioned here, because I hold
the view that they should be controlled by way of mandatory terms. All the
terms listed in the instruments considered are not necessarily mentioned
here, but only those which are commonly listed in more than one system.
Sometimes a listed item should rather explicitly be a requirement for the
incorporation of a term, and then it is also not included in this discussion. For
example, the Directive greylists a term which has the object or effect of
binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity to
become acquainted.150 This situation should rather be controlled by a
separate provision on incorporation of terms. For example, the Dutch and
German Civil Codes contain a separate provision which provides, in effect,
that a standard term is not incorporated into the contract or is voidable if the
user did not give the other party a reasonable opportunity to become
acquainted with the term.151 The proposed South African legislation should
include a similar provision.
A further caveat is that, with some exceptions, the discussion in this part
takes no deﬁnite view on whether the terms mentioned belong more
properly in a black list or in a grey list. The footnotes should indicate their
status in the different laws considered.
The terms are identiﬁed with non-negotiated terms in consumer
transactions in mind, but in some laws surveyed certain listed items also apply
to business-to-small business contracts or to B2B contracts generally, or to
144 Article 51, Consumer Protection Code of 1990 (Código de Defesa do Consumidor).
145 Articles 8 and 9, Consumer Contract Act 129 of 2001.
146 Section 4, Unfair Contract Terms Act BE 2540 (1997).
147 See note 17. The (short) grey list is set out in the Schedule to the Unfair Contract Terms Rules, an
Annex to the Model Law.
148 The UK Bill’s grey list is set out in Schedule 2.
149 Council of Europe Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and an appropriate method of control: resolution
(76)47 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16 November 1976 and explanatory
memorandum (1977) at 14–6.
150 Item (i).
151 Section 6:233 BW; § 305(2).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL148
negotiated terms.152 For the sake of convenience I will use the term
‘business’ to refer to the party who drafted the term in advance and beneﬁts
from it, and ‘consumer’ to refer to the other party.
The fourteen categories are:
1. terms granting unilateral decision-making power to the business (in
other words, control over the life of the contract and its terms);
2. other terms which unfairly prevent the parties from having equal rights;
3. terms governing the duration of the contract;
4. exclusion or restriction of liability normally imposed by law ;
5. indemnity clauses;
6. exclusion or restriction of remedies normally available to the consumer
(some laws assume this to be included in item (4) above, but others
provide separately for restriction on particular remedies);
7. procedural hindrances to the consumer’s right to take legal action (in
other words, terms relating to disputes or proceedings);
8. exclusion of reliance on prior and subsequent undertakings and
representations;
9. ﬁctional declarations or receipts;
10. payment of compensation or penalties by the consumer, including
liquidated damages clauses and forfeiture clauses;
11. transfer of rights and/or obligations to a third party;
12. unfair imposition of risk;
13. terms relating to security;
14. unfair enforcement clauses.
1. Terms conferring unfair unilateral decision-making power upon the business
A wide range of listed terms can be classiﬁed under this category. These
include:
(a) terms according to which the consumer is bound to the contract
whereas the business’s obligation to perform depends on satisfaction of a
condition wholly within the latter’s control;153
(b) terms granting the business an unreasonably long or insufﬁciently
deﬁned period for acceptance of the consumer’s offer154 — this overlaps
to some extent with the previous item;
(c) terms granting the business an unreasonably long or insufﬁciently
deﬁned period for performance of the contract;155
(d) terms which entitle the business to unilaterally alter or depart from the
performance undertaken by him, such as the characteristics of the
152 See Part III supra.
153 Item (c) in the Annex to the Directive; para 3 of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ Bill’s list
(hereafter ‘UK Bill’); s 51(IX) Brazilian legislation (‘leaves supplier with option whether to conclude the
contract, while obligating the consumer’). See also Aronstam op cit note 8 at 215–7.
154 Item 1 of the Council of Europe’s list op cit note 150; art 6:237(a) BW; § 308(1) BGB; § 6(1)(1)
Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz.
155 Article 6:237(e) BW; § 308(1) and (2) BGB. Cf Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 7.
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product or service to be provided156 — and such terms would typically
only be greylisted157 or otherwise qualiﬁed by evaluative factors such as
‘without good reason’ or ‘unless this is reasonable’;158
(e) terms which entitle the business to unilaterally increase the price
speciﬁed, or to link it to the price at delivery, without allowing the
consumer to terminate upon a price increase;159
(f ) terms which allow the business to unilaterally modify the terms of the
contract generally;160
(g) terms which leaves the determination of whether the business has
performed the contract to itself;161
(h) terms entitling the business to free itself of its duty to perform without
an objectively justiﬁable reason162 — and sometimes lists would refer in
this regard speciﬁcally to terms entitling the business to terminate the
contract163 and/or to terms entitling the business to withhold fulﬁlment
of its obligation without good reason;164
(i) terms giving the business the exclusive right to interpret any term of the
contract.165
Some lists suggest that these types of terms may be ‘saved’ if the consumer
is given a corresponding power. For example, item (d) of the Directive’s list
refers to terms ‘permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the
consumer where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract,
without providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an
equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party
cancelling the contract’. Five of the types of terms mentioned in the list of
‘factors’ to be taken into account under the Victoria Fair Trading Act 16 of
1999, also reﬂect this kind of approach.166
The unfairness of, say, the supplier terminating the contract on a
discretionary basis for no good reason, would not be removed merely by
pointing to a non-negotiated term which also gives the consumer that
power. It should therefore not be accepted as a matter of course that the
absence of reciprocity is all that makes such terms objectionable.
156 Item (k) Directive; para 12 UK Bill; § 308(4) BGB; § 6(2)(3) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; cf
s 3(2) UCTA, the ‘factor’ in s 2(j) of the South African Law Commission’s Bill and s 32X(g) Victoria Fair
Trading Act.
157 As in the Directive.
158 See, for example, item (k) Directive; para 12 UK Bill; § 308(4) BGB.
159 Item (l) Directive; paras 13 and 14 UK Bill; cf s 32X(f ) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
160 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 5; item (j) Directive; para 11 UK Bill; art 22(c) Portuguese
legislation; cf s 32X(d) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
161 Article 6:236(d) BW (blacklisted); para 15 UK Bill; § 6(1)(10) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art
21(b) Portuguese legislation; Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 6. See also the ‘guideline’ in s 2(u) of
the South African Law Commission’s Bill; cf s 32X(h) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
162 § 308(3) BGB; see also the authorities in the next two footnotes.
163 § 308(3) BGB; art 6:237(d) BW (grey list); § 6(2)(1) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art 18(f ) and
22(b) Portuguese legislation; para (8) UK Bill; cf items (f ) and (g) Directive; s 32X(b) Victoria Fair Trading
Act; s 4(3) Thailand Unfair Contract Terms Act; Aronstam op cit note 8 at 215–217.
164 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 9; cf art 6:237(d) BW (grey list); s 4(4) Thailand Unfair
Contract Terms Act.
165 Item (m) Directive; art 18(e) Portuguese legislation; cf s 32X(h) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
166 Sections 32X(a)-(e).
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The following types of terms listed above require further discussion.
(i) Unilateral alteration of or departure from the performance undertaken (item (d)
above)
Whereas unilateral modiﬁcation clauses without a right to compensation are
blacklisted in Portugal,167 it is more realistic to greylist such clauses,168 or in
any event to qualify them with evaluative factors such as ‘without good
reason speciﬁed in the contract’169 or ‘unless this is reasonable’.170
Terms allowing unilateral modiﬁcation of the characteristics of the
product or services may sometimes be reasonable when the contract states
that this would only be done when circumstances beyond the company’s
control prevents it from rendering the agreed performance, in which case the
consumer will immediately be notiﬁed and the product be replaced with one
of superior standard and value. Allowing the consumer to terminate the
contract and to claim compensation may also save such a clause.
(ii) Unilateral price increases (item (e) above)
There is divergence amongst legal systems as to how exactly to word the
item dealing with unilateral price increases.
The English and Scottish Law Commissions’ Bill (which generally follows
the Directive’s list rather closely) has improved the Directive’s ‘price increase
item’. The UK Bill greylists a term ‘entitling [the business] to increase the
price speciﬁed in the contract, unless there is also a term entitling [the
consumer] to cancel the contract if the business does increase the price’.171 It
also greylists a term ‘requiring [the consumer] to pay whatever price is set for
the goods at the time of delivery (including a case where the price is set by
reference to a list price), unless there is also a term entitling the consumer to
cancel the contract if that price is higher than the price indicated to it when
the contract was made’.172
The Austrian, Dutch and German legislative provisions are more detailed,
perhaps because they are not content with greylisting price increase clauses,
but blacklist these. They blacklist a term allowing a price increase within a
speciﬁed short period after conclusion of the contract, namely two,173
167 Section 19(i).
168 Article 6:237(c) BW.
169 For example, item (k) Directive (‘enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid
reason any characteristics of the product or service to be provided’), and item (j) Directive (‘enabling the
seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is speciﬁed in the
contract’). See also Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 5, and paras 11 and 12 UK Bill.
170 § 308(4) BGB; § 6(2)(3) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz
171 Paragraph 14. Cf with item (l) Directive.
172 Paragraph 13 UK Bill.
173 § 6(2)(4) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz.
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three174 or four months175 respectively.176 AGerman court held that a clause
allowing a price increase after four months could be unfair as well under the
general clause. Thus the decision to put a deﬁnite time scale in such clauses
seems unwise, and a vaguer, greylisting approach is preferable.
The ﬁrst part of the Austrian black list, which applies to negotiated terms
as well, only permits a right to modify prices where this is factually justiﬁed,
in circumstances described in the contract, which are independent of the
business’s will, as long as downward adjustment is also provided for, that is, if
the factors stated to be relevant to the alteration of the price justify a decrease
in price.177 These are the types of factors which are relevant to the
consideration of a more generally worded greylisted item, such as that of the
UK legislation. It is probably not necessary to spell them out in the grey list
itself.
Although the UK Bill’s formulation is commendable, it is more complex
than it seems, because, as under the Directive, an exception is later made in
respect of contracts for the sale of foreign currency, and for transfer of
securities, ﬁnancial instruments or anything else, the price of which is linked
to ﬂuctuations in prices quoted on a stock exchange, or a ﬁnancial index or
market rate.178 These exceptions, which also apply to other items in the list,
will be discussed in more depth under the next rubric.
(iii) Unilateral variation of (the rest of ) the contract (item ( f ) above)
Some instruments do not contain a separate item on unilateral alteration of
performance or price, but only lists in a more general manner ‘terms
whereby the supplier reserves the right to decide unilaterally to modify or
repudiate the contract otherwise than on proper grounds which are expressly
stated in the contract’.179
Some of the laws that explicitly list unilateral alteration of performance or
price increases, add such a general item to ensure all other unilateral
variations are covered.180
Both the UK Bill and the Directive provides for detailed exceptions to the
listing of this type of term.181 First, these instruments except unilateral
changes in interest rates and other charges in ﬁnancial services agreements,
provided the consumer or small business is informed of the variation as soon
as is practicable and is allowed to cancel the contract.182 Secondly, the listing
174 Article 6:236(i) BW.
175 § 309(1) BGB.
176 Article 6:236(i) BW. The German provision does not apply to goods or services supplied in the course
of a recurring obligation. The Austrian provision also only applies in respect of performances to be made
within two months after the contract.
177 § 6(1)(5) Konsumentenschutzgesetz.
178 Paragraph 24 of Schedule 2, which applies (inter alia) to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the list. The UK Bill
has improved the Directive’s list of exemptions.
179 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 5.
180 For example the Directive in item (j). See also para 11 UK Bill; cf s 32X(d) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
181 See also art 22(2),(3) and (4) Portuguese legislation.
182 Paragraphs 22(3) and (4) of Schedule 2.
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of unilateral variation of terms does not apply to a term in a contract of
indeﬁnite duration if the contract also provides that the business user must
give reasonable notice of the variation, and the consumer may then cancel
the contract.183 Lastly, there is also an exception in regard to the variation of
terms in contracts for the sale of foreign currency, and for the transfer of
securities, ﬁnancial instruments, etc.184
The OFT petitioned the English and Scottish Law Commissions to
recommend scrapping all the exceptions to the list.185 They argued that the
list of exceptions had been the cause of considerable problems and
conﬂicting interpretations.186 These had also been used by some parties to
argue for the exclusion of such terms from the fairness test altogether, not
merely from the grey list.187 The Law Commissions responded by
conﬁrming the OFT’s interpretation of the law, namely that the exceptions
are exempt from the grey list but still subject to the fairness test.188 However,
they chose to retain the exceptions in reformulated form, as they considered
that an indication that certain terms are not likely to be regarded as unfair is
useful, and as these exceptions provide formal ‘recognition of the legitimate
interests of suppliers of on-going services in markets that are prone to
uncertainty or contain variable pricing elements’.189
This is a sensible approach, but the explanatory memorandum to the
legislation should make it very clear that these excepted clauses are still
subject to the fairness test of the general clause and the plain language and
legibility requirements.
(iv) terms entitling the business to free itself of its duty to perform without an
objectively justifiable reason (item (h) above)
The EC Directive and the UK Bill correctly provide separately for rights to
terminate contracts of indeﬁnite duration on the one hand, and other
contracts, on the other.190
The absence of a mirror provision which also allows the consumer to
terminate the contract is not all that causes unfairness, contrary to what the
UK Bill and Directive suggests.191 It would be best to refer to a term entitling
the business to free itself of its duty to perform, whether by terminating the
183 Paragraph 23 of Schedule 2.
184 Paragraph 24 of Schedule 2.





190 Paragraph 6 UK Bill refers to ‘a term entitling B to cancel the contract without incurring liability,
unless there is also a term entitling A to cancel it without incurring liability.’ See also item (f ) Directive.
Paragraph 8 UK Bill then refers to ‘a term in a ﬁxed-term contract or a contract of indeﬁnite duration
entitling B to terminate the contract without givingA reasonable advance notice (except in an urgent case).’
The latter clause should not refer to a ﬁxed-term contract, as a ﬁxed term contract does not normally entitle
a party to terminate it by notice anyway. Item (g) in the Directive’s list correctly omits the reference to a
ﬁxed-term contract.
191 Paragraph 6 UK Bill, item (f ) Directive.
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contract or otherwise, without an objectively justiﬁable reason. A separate
item should then greylist a term in a contract of indeﬁnite duration entitling
the business to terminate the contract without giving the consumer
reasonable advance notice (except in an urgent case). The inclusion of a
mirror image provision in favour of the consumer would then merely be a
factor when the fairness of the grey listed clause is considered.
2. Other terms which unfairly prevent the parties from having equal rights
An example of such a clause is one which grants the business the right to
claim costs of legal action or interest on a particular higher scale than
otherwise applicable, whereas the consumer is not granted the same right.192
Such clauses are common in South African standard terms. Although this
category is not explicitly listed in any of the lists surveyed here, such terms
should be held to be unfair. The example supplied could perhaps be classiﬁed
under the tenth category discussed here, which relates to payment of
compensation or penalties by the consumer.
3. Terms governing the duration of the contract
Several lists refer to terms governing the duration of contracts for the
recurring supply of goods or services. The items listed may concern, ﬁrst, the
initial duration of such contracts; or, secondly, the automatic extension of
contracts of ﬁxed duration. In this regard, some lists control the length of the
new period, and, usually, the notice period for an expression of a desire by
the consumer not to extend the contract.
The Dutch and German Civil Code list a contract for the recurring (or
periodic) supply of goods which binds the consumer for more than one or
two years respectively.193 The Portuguese legislation simply blacklists terms
which provide for excessive periods for contracts to remain in force or for
cancelling them.194
Both the Dutch and German Codes blacklist a tacit extension of the
contractual relationship which binds the consumer for a period of more than
one year,195 whereas the Council of Europe’s list refers to ‘an unreasonably
long period’ in this regard.196
Terms which set an unreasonably early date before expiration of a ﬁxed
term contract’s current period for the consumer to express a desire not to
extend the contract are also often listed.197 Once again, the German Civil
192 See also Munckenbeck & Marshall v Harold [2005] All ER (D) 227; Beale op cit note 52 at paras 15–076
and 15–086.
193 § 309(9)(a) BGB (blacklisted); art 6:237(k) BW (greylisted).
194 Article 22(a).
195 § 309(9)(b) BGB; art 6:236(j) BW.
196 Op cit note 150 item 4.
197 Item (h) Directive; para 9 UK Bill; art 22(h) Portuguese legislation; cf Council of Europe op cit note
150 item 3.
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Code prefers to put a speciﬁed time limit on this notice period, namely three
months prior to the expiration of the current period.198
The SouthAfrican Consumer Protection Bill has mandatory provisions on
agreements for continuous services which obviate the need to list the kinds
of clauses considered above in any black or grey list of clauses in the part on
unfair terms.199
4. Terms excluding or restricting liability normally imposed by law
Some laws are content with only one or two widely framed items in their list
which refer to terms limiting the supplier’s liability. An example is art
6:237( f ) of the Dutch Civil Code which simply greylists a clause ‘which
wholly or partially exempts the business or a third party of a legal obligation
to pay damages’.200
Other instruments have a general clause but also make provision for
speciﬁc types of liability.201
A third practice is to list some or all of the following types of terms in this
category:
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of the supplier for negligently
caused personal injury or death;202
(b) excluding or limiting liability for intentional harm or gross negli-
gence;203
(c) excluding or limiting liability for negligence generally;204
(d) excluding or limiting liability for breach of contract (non-
performance);205
(e) excluding or limiting liability for misrepresentations;206
198 § 309(9)(c) BGB. Certain exceptions apply.
199 Section 46(2)(b)(ii) to (v).
200 Cf s 32X(k) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
201 See Council of Europe op cit note 150 items 11–12.
202 Prohibited in s 1(1) UK Bill (replicating s 2(1) UCTA); § 309(7)(a) BGB; § 6(1)(a) Austrian
Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art 18(a) Portuguese legislation. Greylisted in item (a) Directive (injury or death
caused by an act or omission of the supplier).
203 § 309(7)(b) BGB; arts 18(c) and (d) Portuguese legislation. Of course laws which list liability for
negligence generally (see next footnote) would not need to make separate provision for intentional harm
and gross negligence, unless they want to blacklist the latter and greylist the former.
204 Section 1(2) UK Bill is not part of the list in Schedule 2 but effectively greylists such liability:
(‘Business liability for other loss or damage resulting from negligence cannot be excluded or restricted by a
contract term or a notice unless the term or notice is fair and reasonable.’). This replicates s 2(2) UCTA. See
also item 2 African Model Law; art 18(b) Portuguese legislation (terms which exclude or limit, directly or
indirectly, responsibility for non-contractual damage caused in the sphere of interest of the other party or
third parties).
205 Item (b) Directive; para 2 UK Bill; clause (xiv) of the list of problematic clauses identiﬁed by the South
African Law Commission’s investigation team (at 10 of the Report op cit note 3); s 4(1) Thai Unfair
Contract Terms Act. Sometimes more speciﬁc provisions are blacklisted such as terms ‘excluding or
restricting the business’s obligation to bear the costs of remedying defective work or goods, particularly in
respect of costs of transport, labour and materials’ (§ 309(8)(b)(cc) BGB). I am not concerned here with
clauses which exclude liability for latent defects. Such liability should be imposed by way of mandatory
implied terms (mandatory rules).
206 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 2; s 57(2)(e)(i) SABill (blacklisting a clause which ‘expresses an
acknowledgement by the consumer that before the agreement was made, no representations or warranties
were made in connection with the agreement by the supplier or a person on behalf of the supplier’).
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(f ) excluding or limiting the business’s obligation to respect commitments
by its agents;207
(g) excluding or limiting vicarious liability for agents or employees;208
The following terms in this category merit further discussion.
(i) Liability for personal injury or death (item (a) above)
Many countries have prohibited exclusion or limitation of business liability
for personal injury or death caused negligently and it is recommended that
this approach should be followed, or that, at the very least clauses of this kind
should be greylisted explicitly, particularly in South Africa where the
Supreme Court of Appeal upheld such a clause in a hospital admission form
not too long ago.209
It may be argued that a developing country like South Africa should be
careful about prohibiting businesses from limiting their liability, since they
may be less likely to be able to afford insurance than businesses in developed
countries; and unable to trade proﬁtably if their prices should include
insurance cover for large claims for personal injury, or if they are subject to
claims without insurance. This may be said to be particularly pertinent in
respect of potential liability towards overseas residents visiting South Africa,
as medical costs and loss of earnings overseas would be much higher than in
South Africa. However, this in itself is no justiﬁcation for shifting the risk
onto consumers as a matter of course in the non-negotiated terms, as
consumers are even less likely to be able to bear the loss involved and cannot
guard against the negligence of the business. Businesses offering services to
overseas tourists should insure sufﬁciently against the possibility of higher
claims than those to be expected from South Africans; and they should
include the cost of such insurance in the price quoted to such tourists, or
otherwise insist on adequate travel insurance in respect of the activity offered
before asking the tourist to agree to the exemption clause.
The OFT has taken the line that a ‘possible route to fairness where the
contract involves an inherently risky activity is that of using warnings against
hazards which provide information, and make clear [that] the customer
needs to take sensible precautions, but do not have the effect of excluding or
restricting liability’.210
Because liability for bodily injury or death caused by negligence is often
excluded by a notice, for example in a car park, the UK approach of a
separate provision in the legislation providing that such liability cannot be
excluded by a term or notice is sensible.
207 Item (n) Directive; Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 2; s 57(2)(e)(i) SA Bill.
208 Section 32X(i) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
209 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA
511 (SCA) the court at least left it open whether liability for negligently causing the death of another could
be excluded (para 12). The court said that it is arguable that such a clause would be contrary to public policy,
especially given the high value placed on the sanctity of life by the common law and the Constitution.
210 Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (February 2001) 1.12. An example of how this was done is given at 59.
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Some laws ﬁnd it necessary to deﬁne ‘personal injury’ to include ‘any
disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition’211 or refer in the
list to ‘the moral or physical integrity or the health of persons’.212
(ii) Liability for negligence (item (c) above)
Some legal systems which list exemption clauses in respect of bodily injury,
death and gross negligence, do not list exemptions for other harm caused by
negligence, being content for these to be subject only to the general
clause.213
Another approach is to blacklist exclusion of liability for delict or tort, but
only prohibit limitations of liability in respect of intent or gross negli-
gence.214
Those that do list exclusion and limitation of liability for negligence
generally indicate that there may be situations in which such clauses are fair,
by greylisting such terms215 or qualifying the listing with a phrase such as ‘to
an unjustiﬁed extent’216 or ‘unless this is reasonable’.217 Indeed clauses
excluding or limiting liability for negligence may sometimes be reasonable.
This could be the case, for example, if ‘it is reasonably practicable to obtain
the service elsewhere, if the task is very difﬁcult with a high risk of failure, or
where it would be impossible to obtain adequate insurance cover against a
potential liability that would be ruinous without insurance’.218
Nevertheless, exemption clauses in respect of negligence should still be
greylisted as that puts the business on notice that it should carefully consider
the justiﬁcation of limiting or excluding liability, and not be content with
inserting an exemption clause as a matter of course.
Because liability for negligence is often excluded by a notice, for example
in a car park, the UK approach of a separate provision in the legislation
providing that such liability cannot be excluded by a term or notice unless
the term or notice is fair and reasonable is sensible.219
(iii) Liability for breach (item (d) above)
The legal systems considered again diverge as to how exactly to deal with
exclusions or limitations of liability for breach.
Some do not speciﬁcally refer to this type of term as other items would
already cover it. For example, the Dutch Civil Code refers instead to the
211 Section 32 UK Bill, replicating s 14 UCTA.
212 Article 18(a) Portuguese legislation.
213 For example, Germany.
214 Articles 8(3) and (4) Japanese Consumer Contract Act.
215 For example, in the Zimbabwean legislation and African Model Law.
216 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 12.
217 Section 14 UCTA (which also applies to B2B contracts).
218 J Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract 28 ed (2002)198, with reference to Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC
831 858-9. See also Maxeiner op cit note 11 at 169; cf Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd [1984] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 211.
219 Section 1(2) UK Bill, replicating s 2(2) UCTA.
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exclusion or restriction of the different types of remedies normally available
for breach.220
The Directive chose to refer to two types of exemption clauses: those that
relate to bodily injury and death and those which have the object and effect
of an inappropriate exclusion or limitation of the consumer’s legal rights in
the event of breach.221
5. Indemnity clauses
The Dutch Civil Code blacklists indemnity clauses in respect of consumer
contracts, referring to terms which oblige the consumer to compensate a
third party for damage caused to him by the business or a person or property
for which the business is liable, or which obliges the consumer to contribute
a greater portion than she would be obliged to do under law.222
The English and Scottish Law Commissions decided that it is unnecessary
to replicate in their Bill s 4 UCTA which imposes a reasonableness
requirement on indemnity clauses in consumer contracts, as they would be
sufﬁciently covered by the general clause.
6. Terms excluding or restricting specific contractual remedies normally available to
the consumer
As noted above, the UK Bill and the Directive assumes that the item on
liability for breach includes restrictions on the consumer’s remedies other
than damages, such as the right to terminate or a right to retention. The UK
Bill deﬁnes ‘excluding or restricting liability’ in its list of deﬁnitions as
including ‘excluding or restricting a right or remedy in respect of the
liability’.223 However, these instruments do refer in a separate item in the list
to terms restricting the consumer’s right to withhold or suspend performance
in the case of breach224 as well as to exclusion of the right to set-off claims.
Other legal systems’ lists provide explicitly for limitations on these types of
remedies, sometimes in addition to a general item on exclusion of limitation
of liability,225 sometimes without such an item.226 The following types of
terms are involved:
(a) excluding or restricting the consumer’s right to claim performance;227
(b) excluding or restricting the consumer’s right to terminate the con-
tract;228
220 Article 6:237(a), (b), (c), ( f ), (g) BW. Cf s 32X(k) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
221 Item (b). See also paragraph 2 UK Bill.
222 Section 6:236(h) BW.
223 Section 30(1). See also the explanatory memorandum to the grey list.
224 Paragraph 17 UK Bill.
225 Such as the Council of Europe’s list op cit note 150 (general item on limitation of liability in item 12,
speciﬁc items on remedies in items 14–18 and 21).
226 As in the Dutch Civil Code.
227 Article 6:236(a) BW (blacklisted). See also the ‘factor’ in s 2(s) of the SouthAfrican Law Commission’s
Bill.
228 Article 6:236(b) BW (blacklisted); § 309(8)(a) BGB; art 18( f ) Portuguese legislation; Council of
Europe op cit note 150 items 14 and 15.
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(c) excluding or restricting the consumer’s right to withhold or suspend
performance;229
(d) excluding or restricting the right to set-off claims as allowed by law;230
(e) excluding or restricting a right of retention;231
(f ) compelling the consumer to sue a third party ﬁrst before he will be able
to act against the party proffering the term.232
Because the Dutch legislation does not have a separate item on exclusion
of limitation of liability generally, it also greylists exclusion or limitation of
the consumer’s right to claim damages otherwise allowed by law.233
As noted before, if a legislature decides not to refer explicitly to limitations
on these remedies, but is content with a clause referring to exclusion or
restriction of liability, it would be necessary to refer to these types of clauses
in the examples in the explanatory memorandum, as they may not spring to
mind immediately when exclusion or restriction of liability is considered.
7. Unfair procedural limitations on or hindrances to the consumer’s right to take
legal action
In this regard, one often ﬁnds an item containing a general deﬁnition such as
the heading of this section, sometimes coupled with some particular
examples in the same item or thereafter.234 The following clauses in this
category are sometimes listed explicitly:
(a) compulsory arbitration clauses in respect of consumer contracts;235
(b) terms which alter the normal burden of proof to the detriment of the
customer;236
229 Article 6:236(c) BW (blacklisted); § 309(2) BGB; § 6(1)(6) and (7) Austrian Konsumentens-
chutzgesetz; Council of Europe op cit note 150 items 17 and 18; para 17 UK Bill; cf art 18(g) Portuguese
legislation.
230 Item (b) Directive; para 17 UK Bill; art 6:237(g) BW (greylisted); § 309(3) BGB; § 6(1)(8) Austrian
Konsumentenschutzgesetz; Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 21. See also the ‘guideline’ in s 2(v) of
the South African Law Commission’s Bill.
231 § 309(2)(b) BGB (in so far as the right of retention arises from the same contractual relationship); art
18(g) Portuguese legislation.
232 Section 2(u) of the South African Law Commission’s Bill.
233 Article 6:237( f ) BW. See also arts 8(1) and (2) Japanese Consumer Contract Act.
234 The Unfair Terms Directive lists a term with the object or effect of ‘excluding or hindering the
consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law,
should lie with another party to the contract’ (item (q)). See also para 20 UK Bill, s 13(1)(a) UCTA.
235 Greylisted in item (q) Directive; replicated in, for example, the UK UTCCR; prohibited outright for
consumer contracts in § 6(2)(7) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz, art 51(VII) Brazilian legislation and in
respect of claims below a certain amount in the UK (Unfair Arbitration Agreements (Speciﬁed Amount)
Order 1999, SI 1999 No 2167 reg 3. Article 6:236 BW prohibits a compulsory arbitration clause unless the
clause provides the consumer at least one month after the business has relied in writing upon the clause, to
chose for the dispute to be decided by a court.
236 Item (q) Directive; Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 25; § 309(12) BGB; § 6(1)(11) Austrian
Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art 21( f ) Portuguese legislation; art 51(VI) Brazilian legislation; item 6 African
Model Law and Zimbabwean Consumer Contracts Act. See also clause (i) of the problematic provisions
identiﬁed by the South African Law Commission’s investigation team which ‘should receive the critical
attention of the legislature’ (at 8 of the Report op cit note 3). Cf the ‘factors’ in s 2(p) of the South African
Law Commission’s Bill and s 32X(m) Victoria Fair Trading Act.
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(c) terms which unduly restrict the evidence available to the customer237 or
which otherwise exclude or restrict rules of evidence or procedure;238
(d) unfair choice of forum clauses;239
(e) unfair choice of a different law to the one where the conclusion and
implementation of the contract occurred or is foreseen;240
(f ) terms which impose unreasonably brief limitation periods for com-
plaints or claims;241
(g) terms that require the consumer to take unreasonable action in order to
exercise contractual rights.242
The English and Scottish Law Commissions’ (separate) deﬁnition of
‘excluding or restricting liability’ also embraces several of these types of
clauses, such as ‘making a right or remedy in respect of the liability subject to
a restrictive or onerous condition’.243
Term (g) mentioned above could also be subsumed by a more general
additional category, namely terms requiring a declaration or notice by the
consumer to the business or a third party to be in a particular form that is
stricter than a writing requirement or to special requirements with regard to
receipt.244
8. Exclusion of reliance on prior and subsequent undertakings and representations
The Directive and the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ Bill grey list
terms with the object or effect of limiting the business’s liability for
statements or promises made by its employees or agents, or making its
liability for statements or promises subject to formalities.245 This is preferable
to the South African draft legislation’s provision, which prohibits a narrower
type of term, namely, an ‘acknowledgement by the consumer that before the
237 Item (q) Directive; art 21(d) Portuguese legislation. Cf the ‘factors’ in s 2(p) of the South African Law
Commission’s Bill and s 32X(l) of the Victoria Fair Trading Act.
238 Section 13(1)(c) UCTA; s 30 UK Bill; clauses (xi) and (ii) of the clauses identiﬁed by the SouthAfrican
investigation team as problematic (at 8 & 10 of the Law Commission’s Report op cit note 3).
239 Article 19(g) of the Portuguese legislation which prohibits a forum choice which involves grave
inconvenience for one of the parties, without the interests of the other party justifying this. See also clauses
(vii), (viii) and (ix) of the SouthAfrican investigation team’s list of problematic clauses (at 9 of the Report op
cit note 3).
240 Article 19(h) of the Portuguese legislation which prohibits a choice of foreign law, when the
inconvenience this causes to one of the parties are not compensated by serious and objective interests of the
other party. See also clause (v) of the SouthAfrican investigation team’s list of problematic clauses (at 9 of the
Report op cit note 3).
241 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 26; the ‘factor’ in s 2(k) of the SA Law Commissions’ Bill
(‘whether prejudicial time limits are imposed on the other party’); art 6:236(g) BW; cf art 22(l) of the
Portuguese legislation. The Dutch and German Civil Codes refers to speciﬁed time limits in this regard (art
6:236(g) BW; § 309(8(b)(ee) and (ff) BGB).
242 Article 22(o) of the Portuguese legislation prohibits terms which require, for performance of acts
under the contract, formalities which are not provided for by law or which commit parties to take
unreasonable action in order to exercise contractual rights. An example is clause 5.3 of Afrox’s standard
terms according to which the customer must, within 3 days of the alleged breach or defect occurring, give
Afrox 30 days written notice by prepaid registered post to rectify any defect or breach of agreement
(available on their website http://www.afrox.co.za/customer/sale.cfm, last accessed 10 June 2006).
243 Section 13(1)(b), replicated in s 30 UK Bill.
244 § 309(13) BGB; § 6(1)(4) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; cf art 22(o) Portuguese legislation.
245 This is the wording of para 16 of the UK Bill’s list, which is similar, but preferable to item (n) of the
Directive’s list.
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agreement was made, no representations or warranties were made in
connection with the agreement by the supplier or a person on behalf of the
supplier.’246 The Directive’s and UK Bill’s wider formulation is better able to
catch all sorts of terms aimed at achieving this effect.
9. Fictional declarations or receipts
Some laws list ‘deeming provisions’ whereby a declaration or statement is
deemed to be made by the consumer (ﬁctional declaration) or a declaration is
deemed to be received by him under certain circumstances (ﬁctional
receipt).247
The South African Law Commission’s Bill provides that the following
‘factor’ may be considered in deciding whether a term is, for instance,
unconscionable: ‘whether the term provides that a party against whom the
term is proffered shall be deemed to have made or not made a statement to
his detriment if he or she does or fails to do something, unless (i) a suitable
period of time is granted to him or her for the making of an express
declaration thereon, and (ii) at the commencement of the period, the party
proffering the term undertakes to draw the attention of the party against
whom the term is proffered to the meaning that will be attached to his or her
conduct’.248 This formulation is based on the blacklisted clause in § 308(5)
BGB, which also inspired § 6(1)(2) of the Austrian consumer legislation and
should be used. It catches a wider range of deeming clauses than the
formulation of the new South African Bill, which prohibits a clause which
‘expresses an acknowledgment that the consumer has received goods or
services, or a document that is required by this Act to be delivered to the
consumer, and that have or has not in fact been delivered or rendered to the
consumer.’
In respect of ﬁctional receipts, the BGB is stricter than the South African
and Austrian formulations. It simply blacklists ‘a provision which provides
that a declaration by the business of particular importance is deemed to have
been received by the consumer.’249 By contrast, the South African ‘factor’ is
‘whether a term provides that a statement made by the party proffering the
term which is of particular interest to the party against whom the term is
proffered shall be deemed to have reached the party against whom the term is
proffered, unless such statement has been sent by prepaid registered post to
the chosen address of the party against whom the term is proffered.’250
Although the Directive or the UK legislation does not list ﬁctional
declarations or receipts it is noteworthy that the OFT has acted against and
considers as usually unfair ‘consumer declarations about contractual circum-
246 Section 57(2)(e)(i).
247 § 308(5) and (6) BGB; § 6(1)(2) and (3) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; cf s 6:236(l) and (m) BW;
s 2(q) and (r) of the South African Law Commission’s list of ‘factors’. Cf also MacDonald op cit note 39 at
249 on action taken by the OFT against similar clauses.
248 Section 2(q).
249 § 308(6) BGB.
250 Cf also § 6(1)(3) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art 6:236(l) and (m) BW.
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stances, such as that the consumer has read the terms of the agreement or has
examined goods prior to purchase.’251
10. Payment of compensation or penalties by the consumer (including forfeiture
clauses)
Laws often provide separately for the following types of clauses which
involve the consumer paying compensation, whether afresh or in the form of
the forfeiture of moneys already paid:
(a) penalty clauses;252
(b) ‘liquidated damages’ clauses (lump-sum payments for damages);253
(c) forfeiture clauses, whether linked to breach by the consumer or not;254
(d) clauses relating to other compensation, for example, reimbursement of
expenses or compensation for use of property.
In South Africa, it would be unnecessary to list penalty clauses as the
Conventional Penalties Act255 deals comprehensively with penalty clauses,
including liquidated-damages clauses and forfeiture clauses, by granting
judges an equitable discretion to reduce them.
Some legislation also lists clauses obliging the consumer to pay compensa-
tion when the contract is cancelled for other reasons than her breach, which
cannot therefore be described as ‘penalty clauses’.256 For example, in
addition to its listing of penalty clauses and lump-sum damages claims, the
German Civil Code lists terms whereby the business, upon termination of
the contract by either party, can demand unreasonably high remuneration
for the utilization or use of a thing or a right, or for performance made; or
can demand unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure.257 The
English and Scottish Law Commissions also propose listing a term entitling
the business, if the consumer exercises a right to cancel the contract, to keep
sums she has paid in respect of services which the business has yet to supply.
These would be part of forfeiture clauses in a wider sense.258
11. Transfer of rights and/or obligations to a third party
Terms which allow the transfer of the business user’s obligations and/or
rights to a third party to the detriment of the consumer are listed in several
countries, but with quite different formulations. It is recommended that the
251 UK Law Commission Consultation Paper op cit note 94 at 99, with reference to the OFT’s Unfair
Contract Terms Guidance of 2001, group 18(e).
252 Item (e) Directive; para 5 UK Bill; art 19(c) Portuguese legislation; § 309(5) BGB (lump-sum claims
for damages controlled by prerequisites to protect consumers) and § 309(6) BGB (penalty clauses
blacklisted); S 6:237(i) BW (greylisted); art 9 Japanese Consumer Contract Act; Council of Europe op cit
note 150 item 28 (listing an excessive obligation upon non-performance). Cf § 6(1)(13) Konsumentens-
chutzgesetz.
253 Ibid.
254 Item (d) Directive; para 4 UK Bill.
255 Act 15 of 1962.
256 Article 6:237(i) BW.
257 § 308(7) BGB.
258 See also s 57(2)( f ) of the draft South African legislation.
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list treats a transfer of rights separately from a transfer of obligations, as in the
Dutch Civil Code and the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ Bill. The
latter simply greylists ‘a term entitling the business to transfer its obligations
without the consumer’s consent’259 and then, separately, ‘a term entitling the
business to transfer its rights in circumstances where the consumer’s position
might be weakened as a result.’260 The latter item is similar to s 6:236( f ) BW,
which blacklists a term which, upon transfer of rights to a third party, allows
the exclusion or limitation of powers and defences which would have been
available to the consumer against the third party transferee.261 The UK
provision, being wider, is preferable. Concerning the transfer of obligations,
the Dutch Civil Code has a more elaborate provision, probably explained by
its inclusion in the black list and not the grey list as under the UK Bill.
Section 6:236(e) BW prohibits prior agreement to transfer of obligations,
unless the consumer is given the right to cancel, or the business user remains
liable for performance by the third party, or the transfer occurs in connection
with the transfer of a business of which all the rights and obligations are
transferred. These seem sensible ‘exceptions’ and the item should be
formulated in this manner.
The formulation in the German, Austrian and Portuguese black lists are
too rigid and would not allow all the types of exceptions mentioned in the
Dutch clause, which are indeed reasonable.262 The Directive’s item, on the
other hand, does not sufﬁciently protect consumers. It lists a transfer of
obligations only in so far as ‘this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the
consumer’.263 However, this does not sufﬁciently recognize that it may be
unfair in itself for a consumer to discover that someone else is to perform a
service than the business trusted by her, even where she still has the same
rights or ‘guarantees’ under the contract against the third party.
12. Unfair imposition of risk
The New Zealand Law Commission identiﬁed as problematic clauses which
make goods at buyer’s or owner’s risk while in possession of the seller or
repairer.264 Such clauses are sometimes encountered in South African
contracts: the customer carries the risk in respect of defective goods brought
back for repairs.265 Either the narrower New Zealand formulation or a wider
259 Paragraph 18 UK Bill. Cf s 32X(j) Victoria Fair TradingAct (‘whether the term has the object or effect
of permitting the supplier to assign the contract to the consumer’s detriment without the consumer’s
consent’).
260 Paragraph 19 UK Bill; item (p) Directive.
261 See also Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 2; and clause (vi) of the list of terms identiﬁed as
problematic by the South African Law Commission’s investigation team (at 9 of the Report, op cit note 3).
262 § 309(10) BGB; § 6(2)(2) Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz; art 18(l) Portuguese legislation.
263 Item (p) Directive.
264 This is reported by the South African Law Commission at 150 of their Report op cit note 3, where
they list clauses identiﬁed by the New Zealand Law Commission as justifying intervention. The original
report by the New Zealand Law Commission is not available to me.
265 For example, clause 4.10 of Afrox’s standard terms (supra note 243).
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formulation listing terms modifying the rules regarding the distribution of
risk should be used to discourage such clauses.
13. Terms relating to security.
Both the Council of Europe’s list and the New Zealand Law Commission
have identiﬁed as problematic terms whereby the supplier can require
excessive security.266
The Council of Europe also lists ‘terms whereby the supplier imposes on
the consumer, without good reason, immediate payment of an excessive part
of the price prior to performance of the contract,’ a listing which would be
supported by the OFT, who identiﬁed terms requiring full payment in
advance in contracts such as home improvement agreements as usually
unfair, because it operates like a prohibition on set-off.267
The blacklisting of clauses relating to bank cards and PINs in the South
African legislation also relates to this category.268
14. Unfair enforcement clauses
Both the OFT and the South African DTI propose to take action against
unfair enforcement clauses, such as clauses authorizing entry to the
consumer’s premises for the purpose of repossessing goods.269 The draft
South African legislation blacklists similar clauses and the OFT has often
convinced businesses to delete or revise such terms.270
VIII CONCLUSION
Black and grey lists of prohibited and suspect terms are important
mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of unfair contract terms legislation.
The need for a proactive, preventative control paradigm makes them
especially desirable in the consumer context. It is no wonder that such lists
are used in many legal systems and that many experts agree that they are
important to any endeavour to regulate unfair contract terms effectively.
This contribution has drawn on experience in other legal systems to identify
some general principles which should be considered when drafting or
revising black and grey lists. Particular types of terms which are often listed
have also been identiﬁed.
266 Council of Europe op cit note 150 item 24; South African Law Commission Report op cit note 3 at
149 (see note 265).
267 Robert Bradgate ‘Experience in the United Kingdom’ in European Commission Brussels Conference
(op cit note 39) 35 at 48–9.
268 Note 121 above.
269 Section 57(2)(g) of the draft South African legislation (authorization of repossession of goods,
undertaking to sign in advance documentation in respect of enforcement, consent to pre-determined value
of costs relating to enforcement of the agreement); OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (February 2001) 141
who lists as group 18(c) ‘unfair enforcement clauses.’
270 Ibid.
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